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Abstract
Eleanor Knox has argued that our concept of spacetime applies to whichever struc-
ture plays a certain functional role in the laws (the role of determining local inertial
structure). I raise two complications for this approach. First, our spacetime concept
seems to have the structure of a cluster concept, which means that Knox’s inertial
criteria for spacetime cannot succeed with complete generality. Second, the notion
of metaphysical fundamentality may feature in the spacetime concept, in which case
spacetime functionalism may be uninformative in the absence of answers to fundamen-
tal metaphysical questions like the substantivalist/relationist debate.
1 Introduction
In the course of work on conjectured theories of quantum gravity, physicists have begun
to take extremely seriously the possibility that spacetime is not among the fundamental
structures of our universe (Huggett and Wu¨thrich, 2013). This has prompted philosophers
of science to pose the question of what it would take for a non-fundamental or emergent
structure to be spatiotemporal. Independently, Harvey Brown (2005) has argued that one
cannot simply posit that a certain structure, or type of structure, is spatiotemporal. Rather,
a structure may only count as spatiotemporal1 in virtue of playing the right sort of role in
the laws of a theory.
Inspired by Brown’s arguments and aiming to solve the problem of spacetime emergence
(among other problems, including the question of how to identify spacetime structure in
1Or more precisely, to borrow a term of art from Brown, as having chronogeometric significance, i.e. as
being measured directly by physical rods and clocks.
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Newtonian mechanics), Eleanor Knox has recently advanced a functionalist picture of space-
time. On a functionalist picture, whether an entity (a structure, object or property–from
now on I will just say “structure”) counts as spatiotemporal is determined by its functional
role. The functional role of a physical structure is its role in the physical laws, which often
boils down to its implications about the motion of material objects.
Beyond putting forward this overall functionalist framework, Knox advocates a particular
version of it, which I’ll call inertial functionalism. She suggests that the functional role of
spacetime is to determine the structure of local inertial frames in a theory. (A local inertial
frame is a coordinate system over a small region of a manifold in which the dynamical laws–
the laws of motion, or more generally of time evolution–take on a uniquely “simple form”
(Knox, forthcoming, 12); a more precise definition will follow in the next section.)
I find the overall framework of spacetime functionalism attractive. Many geometrical
structures are used in physics–state space, momentum space, configuration space. Not all of
these deserve the name ‘spacetime’ (Brown, 2005, Section 8.2). Nor is it plausible that the
difference between spacetime and these other geometries is a primitive one. It must have
something to do with each geometric structure’s role in the laws. As Knox rhetorically asks,
“If our conceptual grasp on spacetime is not exhausted by the role it plays in our theory,
what might the extra ingredient be?” (Knox, forthcoming, 9-10) I can’t think of anything.
So I heartily agree with Knox’s basic picture that spacetime is defined by the role it plays
in theories (or laws). But inertial functionalism cannot be the whole story, at least not if the
goal is an analysis or explication of our spacetime concept. For there are clear examples of
theories (so-called topological quantum field theories) which lack the sort of inertial structure
that Knox’s account requires, but which include structures that are obviously playing the
spacetime role in a meaningful sense. Further, certain other theories (those with forces that
violate parity and/or time-reversal invariance) include spacetime structures which will not
count as spatiotemporal on Knox’s account, because they do no work toward determining
inertial structure.
On a more programmatic level, inertial functionalism proceeds from the working assump-
tion that precise necessary and sufficient conditions for the “spacetime role” can be spelled
out. But this strikes me as false, because our spacetime concept has the structure of a cluster
concept. Rather than possessing a single set of necessary and sufficient conditions, cluster
concepts can be satisfied in a variety of different ways by different entities falling under them.
2
Having four legs is neither necessary nor sufficient for a being to fall under our concept of
cat, for example–but it helps a being to count as a cat if it has four legs. The same goes for
inertial structure and our concept of spacetime, I will argue.
Once this cluster concept view of spacetime is appreciated, it is apparent that a vast num-
ber of different theoretical properties and relations can help determine whether a given struc-
ture is spatiotemporal. Among the properties that help determine this, I will argue, is the
property of physical fundamentality. And if this is correct, the question of substantivalism–of
whether the “spacetime” structure posited by a theory is part of its fundamental ontology–is
prior to the question of what counts as spacetime.
It is my understanding, from previous conversation and correspondence with Knox, that
she does not intend to advance her inertial functionalism as a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions that any structure whatsoever must meet in order to count as spatiotemporal.
Rather, she intends her inertial criteria to be necessary and sufficient conditions for a struc-
ture to count as spacetime in a broad class of the theories most commonly discussed in
foundational work (mainly Newtonian and relativistic theories). This is not always clear in
written statements of her view, in which she sometimes suggests that the view is an analysis
of our concept of spacetime (Knox, forthcoming, 2) and that her view entails that (for ex-
ample) there is no spacetime in Aristotelian cosmology because of its impoverished inertial
structure (Knox, forthcoming, 13).
Despite these passages, I take it that Knox is ultimately amenable to my conclusion
that her inertial criteria do not provide general necessary and sufficient conditions for a
structure to count as spatiotemporal. She has also expressed sympathy for my claim that
spacetime is a cluster concept. So in these respects, the present essay should not be seen
as a rejection of Knox’s own position, but rather as an elaboration and filling-in of her
views, together with a correction of some places in which she speaks somewhat loosely.
That said, Knox would not agree with some of my particular claims about which criteria fit
into the spacetime concept, and in particular she would disagree with my conclusion that
the question of substantivalism is prior to the question of which structures should count
as spacetime. And once we appreciate the priority of the substantivalism question (as well
as the examples of parity and time-reversal asymmetry) it will become clear that Knox’s
inertial functionalism is not always a satisfactory account of the spacetime concept even as
it applies to the Newtonian and relativistic theories she has in mind. So what follows is not
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merely an elaboration of Knox, but also an objection to some features of her approach.
2 Knox’s inertial functionalism
“I propose,” Knox writes, “that the spacetime role is played by whatever defines a structure
of local inertial frames.”(Knox, forthcoming, 10) For Knox, inertial frames are coordinate
systems which locally (to the neighborhood of a point) satisfy the following criteria:
1. Inertial frames are frames with respect to which force free bodies move with
constant velocities.
2. The laws of physics take the same form (a particularly simple one) in all
inertial frames.
3. All bodies and physical laws pick out the same equivalence class of inertial
frames (universality). (Knox, 2013, 348)
In a theory like special relativity, with flat spacetime and no gravity, the inertial frames can
be defined globally, but in theories with dynamical spacetime like general relativity we can at
best make do with local inertial frames meeting the criteria above. These will be the frames
in which the affine connection coefficients (Christoffel symbols) vanish in the infinitesimal
vicinity of the location we’re interested in studying (hence the qualification “local inertial
frames”).2 Thus the structure of inertial frames, as Knox uses the term, is specified by giving
the affine (straight line) structure of a spacetime. This means that at least a full specification
of timelike geodesics (possible inertial trajectories for matter particles) will be included in
the structure that defines, in Knox’s sense, the local inertial frames (Knox, 2013, 349).
One might worry that this leaves out a lot of what we ordinarily think of as the building
blocks of spacetime. What about distances, spans of time and intervals–metric structure, in
other words? What about topological structure? Fortunately this is not a problem, because
specifying the timelike geodesics uniquely determines the metric of any solution in general
2In general relativistic field theories exhibiting so-called minimal coupling, such frames will not always
exist even local to a point (see Read et al., preprint). Although this is a serious problem for the scope of
Knox’s inertial functionalism, it is far enough removed from the considerations I wish to raise here that I
will set it aside.
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relativity (up to a global scale factor, which is only needed to specify information which is
unobservable and arguably unphysical).3
Moreover, this view seems to succeed in recovering the two symmetry principles proposed
by Earman (1989, 46):
SP1 Any [external] dynamical symmetry of [a theory] T is a spacetime symmetry
of T .
SP2 Any spacetime symmetry of T is a dynamical symmetry of T .
which Knox, following Myrvold (forthcoming) (and unlike Earman himself) takes to be ana-
lytic truths about the relationship between spacetime symmetries and dynamical symmetries
(Knox, forthcoming, 11). Whenever local inertial frames meeting Knox’s criteria exist, the
strong uncertainty principle will apply, ensuring that the local symmetries of the metric will
be local dynamical symmetries as well.4
Citing these achievements, Knox suggests that her inertial functionalism provides every-
thing we could want from an analysis of our spacetime concept (at least as it applies in
Newtonian and relativistic theories).5 One might object that general relativity is strictly
speaking a theory with no preferred reference frames.6 But there is far from universal agree-
ment that this is the right way to understand general relativity. If the existence of inertial
frames in general relativity is the most controversial assumption presumed by inertial func-
tionalism, Knox’s view would seem to be in good shape.
However, this is not Knox’s only contestable assumption. As we will see in the next sec-
tion, her inertial functionalism gives the wrong verdict about which structures to interpret as
spatiotemporal when applied to several example theories–including parity and time-reversal
violating theories that appear to accurately describe the actual laws of our world.
3More may need to be said to recover non-affine structure in other theories aside from general relativity,
but rather than pursue this point here, let us move on.
4To foreshadow one of the counterexamples I raise in Section 3 below: this will only entail SP1 and SP2
when the symmetries of spacetime are all and only local symmetries of the metric. But this condition fails
when spacetime has discrete asymmetries such as time- or parity-reversal asymmetry.
5To reiterate, she has suggested in discussion that these theories are her view’s intended domain.
6Knox (2013, 348) notes that Erik Curiel and James Weatherall have objected to her view in conversation
along these lines.
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3 Counterexamples to inertial functionalism
I will now present some examples which show (first) that Knox’s inertial functionalism does
not universally succeed as an analysis of our spacetime concept, and (second) that her inertial
functionalism does not always give the right verdict in its intended domain of Newtonian
and relativistic theories either. The first claim I think should be quite uncontroversial after
a bit of thought; the second strikes me as more controversial but still clearly true, once
the examples I have in mind are taken into account. I will begin with a simple but rather
fantastical toy example, and then move on to some more physically interesting ones.
Consider a hypothetical universe consisting of particles with distance relations (invariant,
as in Newtonian mechanics) between them. These particles do not, however, move in accord
with any forces, nor do they undergo continuous motion. Instead, they teleport from place
to place: at any given instant of time, each particle has an equal chance to be located at
any position in space (and an equal chance to be located in either of two regions of equal
volume, etc.).
These particles follow very different laws from the physical objects we’re familiar with.
But I think we can recognize the structure they exist in–the structure that determines the
distance relations and time intervals between them–as spatiotemporal. Yet no definition of
inertial motion can be applied to these particles. They feel no forces, so we cannot define
inertial frames as frames in which force-free particles move at a constant velocity. The
teleporting law that governs their changes of state can be stated with equal simplicity in any
frame, since it appeals only to the notion of volume, which is invariant across frames.
This example may seem alien and silly, and so it is–but I don’t think it’s too silly. That
is, the example is not so alien that it falls completely outside our concept of spacetime.
One might object that the toy theory is empirically meaningless because it cannot describe
observers (or composite objects either), but it shares this feature with Newtonian gravitation,
which cannot describe stable bulk matter, at least not unless other forces are included. Or
one might object that the toy theory does not describe anything we can recognize as matter,
since the “particles” move discontinuously and are not subject to any fundamental forces.
But again, it shares this feature with a serious theory, namely the “flash” formulation of
GRW quantum mechanics (Tumulka, 2009). So I see little reason to conclude that this toy
theory is so strange that our ordinary concept of spacetime must break down if applied to
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it.
Regardless, my case against inertial functionalism does not stand or fall with this single
toy example. There are other more realistic counterexamples as well.
First, consider topological quantum field theories (TQFTs). These are quantum field
theories with no local degrees of freedom. The observables (physically significant quantities)
of these theories are all topological invariants–quantities invariant under spacetime trans-
formations that don’t change topology. Important examples include Chern-Simons theory
(Witten, 1988) and quantized general relativity in three spacetime dimensions (Baez, 2001).
Both these theories see heavy use in foundational work on quantum gravity, including appli-
cations to string theory.
Consider three-dimensional quantum gravity. It is well-known that in three spacetime
dimensions or fewer, general relativity becomes trivial locally, in that the curvature of the
metric at a point is uniquely determined by the matter content at that point. Thus there
are no degrees of freedom within the gravitational field.
That said, the classical theory is not quite trivial globally, because multiple different
topologies are possible. This remains true in the quantum version of three-dimensional grav-
ity, which is able to represent transitions from one spatial topology to another (Baez, 2001,
184-187). Thus it provides a rare and significant example of an indisputably background-
independent quantum theory–a quantum theory that isn’t set within a fixed spacetime.
The important thing about TQFTs for our purposes is that they describe spacetime
without ascribing to it any inertial or metric structure. If one likes, one can define a metric
or affine connection in a TQFT like three-dimensional quantum gravity, but this amounts to
imposing a sort of unphysical choice of gauge. The physical observables of these quantum
theories are quantities like the length of the shortest geodesic with certain connectedness
properties like wrapping around the radius of a closed space some number of times (Baez,
2001, 189).7 To portray these theories as describing inertial structure would be a serious
distortion.
To say that they describe spacetime structure, on the other hand, is no distortion at all.
The theory I’ve just described is a quantum gravity theory whose observables are quantities
like the length of certain geodesics and whose classical limit is a spacetime theory, namely
7Note that which geodesic fulfills these conditions–and indeed, which sets of points form geodesics–need
not be specified in defining such observables.
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general relativity. Some candidate quantum gravity theories describe spacetime as emergent,
of course, but that is clearly not the case here, since the observables are recognizably spa-
tiotemporal. Thus it is possible for spacetime structure to exist in the absence of inertial
structure, contrary to the implications of inertial functionalism.
Of course, TQFTs exist fairly far outside Knox’s intended domain of familiar Newtonian
and relativistic physics. So we have not yet ruled out the possibility that inertial function-
alism suffices for this class of theories. To show that it does not suffice even within that
limited domain will be the task of my next example.
On Knox’s view, the only spatiotemporal structures are those that must be fixed in
order to determine the class of inertial frames. Two structures that do not factor into the
determination of inertial frames are the orientation of time (if the laws can tell the difference
between the past and future) and the orientation of parity or handedness (if the laws can
tell the difference between right- and left-handed objects). A parity transformation, which
mirror-reflects everything in spacetime across some spatial axis, induces no change in which
trajectories count as inertial. Neither does a time-reversal transformation which exchanges
past and future.8
Since they leave inertial structure invariant, Knox’s inertial functionalism would predict
that parity and time-reversal must always be symmetries of spacetime. But this is not so.
In the Standard Model of particle physics, the weak interaction violates parity and is also
thought to violate time-reversal invariance (because it violates CP and the combination of
CP with time-reversal must be a symmetry according to the CPT theorem).
This means that in the spacetime where weak interactions take place, there must be
spatiotemporal structures that determine a preferred direction in time and a preferred parity
orientation. In their discussions of parity violation and substantivalism, Huggett (2000) and
Pooley (2003) present an example of what such a structure would have to look like. To make
sense of an absolute handedness, Huggett writes, “requires the use of an orientation, and
this structure must be a property of or inhere in something distinct from bodies. The only
plausible candidate for the role of supporting the nonrelational structures is the spacetime
8One might still hope to apply Knox’s broader definition, and claim that the temporal or parity orientation
helps determine the class of frames in which the laws are simplest, if (e.g.) inverting parity introduced
additional terms into a theory’s Lagrangian, making the equations of motion “more complicated” in some
frames than in others. But in general, this does not happen in parity- or time-reversal-violating theories.
Instead the only differences appear in the form of the terms (e.g., the introduction of a minus sign).
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manifold” (Huggett, 2000, 236; emphasis in original).
This preferred orientation structure takes the form of a handed field which associates a
preferred parity orientation with each point in spacetime in a continuous way (so that nearby
points agree locally on which orientation is preferred; this entails that all points will agree
globally in spacetimes where global orientation is a well-defined notion). As Huggett suggests
in the quote above, it is not plausible to interpret this orientation field as anything but a
piece of spacetime structure. The orientation field is non-dynamical, located everywhere,
carries no energy or momentum, and possesses the same state in all solutions of the theory–
all features that fit much more naturally with our pre-existing concept of spacetime than
with our concept of matter.
Yet the inertial functionalist cannot consistently acknowledge that the orientation field
is a spatiotemporal structure. It plays no role in the definition of inertial frames, since it
does not couple to the gravitational field and only affects weak interactions like the decay of
certain elementary particles. Inverting the orientation field has no effect on affine structure.
The same is equally true of the temporal orientation required to make sense of weak CP
violation. Inverting the arrow of time does not change which trajectories are inertial. So
a time orientation cannot count as spatiotemporal structure either according to the inertial
functionalist.
There is no question, I think, that this consequence of inertial functionalism is unaccept-
able. I can imagine no clearer case of a structure that should count as part of spacetime than
a preferred direction of time or a preferred handedness.
I’ve acknowledged that the overall approach of spacetime functionalism is highly attrac-
tive, but we’ve seen that Knox’s own functionalist account cannot succeed in capturing our
spacetime concept as it applies to theories like TQFTs and parity-violating interactions. But
these same examples also show that a wide variety of very different structures seem to meet
our existing definition of spacetime. So what hope is there for maintaining that we possess
a single, unified concept of spacetime at all?
There is hope, I claim, if we understand our spacetime concept as a cluster concept.
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4 The cluster concept view
A cluster concept is a concept with multiple criteria of application, none of which are nec-
essary conditions for a thing to fall under the concept. Consider species concepts, like the
concept of a cat. A being’s having four legs is in a sense a criterion for it to count as a cat,
but there are many cats with fewer than four legs. Having four legs is neither necessary nor
sufficient for cat-hood, but a being’s having four legs is (so to speak) a “point in favor” of
its being counting as a cat. Any being that earns enough “cat points” by satisfying enough
such criteria to a sufficient degree (having two ears, chasing mice, making me sneeze, etc.)
will fall under our cat concept.
In his account of our concept of art as a cluster concept, Berys Gaut provides a nice
description of the logical structure of such concepts:
There are several criteria for a concept. How is the notion of their counting
toward the application of a concept to be understood? First, if all the properties
are instantiated, then the object falls under the concept: that is, they are jointly
sufficient for the application of the concept. More strongly, the cluster account
also claims that if fewer than all the criteria are instantiated, this is sufficient
for the application of the concept. Second, there are no properties that are
individually necessary conditions for the object to fall under the concept: that
is, there is no property which all objects falling under the concept must possess.
These conditions together entail that though there are sufficient conditions for the
application of a cluster concept, there are no individually necessary and jointly
sufficient conditions. Third, though there are no individually necessary conditions
for the application of such a concept, there are disjunctively necessary conditions:
that is, it must be true that some of the criteria apply if an object falls under the
concept. This clause is required, for otherwise we will merely have shown that
there are sufficient conditions for a concept to obtain, rather than showing it to
be a cluster concept. (Gaut, 2000, 26-27)
We can readily see how this applies to the cat example. If an entity meets none of the criteria
that we ordinarily take to characterize cats, it is obviously not a cat. But any one of these
properties may be absent in any particular cat, since not all cats have ears, four legs, and
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so on. Being a cat is a matter is a matter of satisfying enough of the criteria to a sufficient
degree.
Rather than showing that inertial structure is a necessary and sufficient condition for
counting as spacetime, I think Knox has shown that inertial structure is one criterion (in
the sense explained above by Gaut) for counting as spacetime. The fact that the Minkowski
metric in special relativity determines the structure of inertial frames is certainly a point in
favor of interpreting that metric as spacetime. But the fact that the preferred orientation in
a parity-violating theory does not help determine inertial structure is not automatic proof
that the preferred orientation isn’t a piece of spacetime structure. There are other criteria
for our spacetime concept besides the determination of inertial frames.
Consider the reasons I adduced earlier in favor of counting the preferred orientation of
a parity-violating theory as spacetime structure: it is located everywhere, non-dynamical,
carries no energy or momentum, and possesses the same state in all solutions of the theory.
The last three of these criteria are not met by spacetime in general relativity. But that does
not mean they aren’t criteria for our spacetime concept, on the cluster concept view. On the
cluster concept view, one would expect most theories to involve a picture of spacetime that
fails some of the criteria for the concept–just as most real-life cats depart in several ways
from the Form of the Ideal Cat.
It may be that since the advent of general relativity, we have revised our spacetime
concept to reject one or more of these criteria, so that they no longer count at all toward our
spacetime concept. Conceptual change tends to accompany scientific revolution, as Kuhn
has taught us. So perhaps (for example) we no longer consider a structure to be a better
candidate for spatiotemporal structure if it is non-dynamical. But it seems plausible at
least that this criterion has been replaced with a new one: it still seems to me to be a
criterion for meeting our spacetime concept that a structure is non-dynamical with respect
to non-gravitational interactions.
Obviously the question of which criteria count toward the spacetime concept will be a
complicated one on the cluster concept view. I won’t make any attempt to give an exhaus-
tive list of candidates here, but the following are examples of criteria which are logically
independent of Knox’s inertial criteria and which seem to also count toward a structure’s
satisfying our spacetime concept:
• The structure is non-dynamical, at least with respect to non-gravitational interactions.
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• The structure is (in some sense) located everywhere in all states of the theory.
• The structure does not carry energy or momentum.
• “Vacuum” solutions exist which describe the (putatively) spatiotemporal structure in
the absence of other structures.
• There are no other structures in the theory which can exist without the (putative)
spacetime structure.
• The structure grounds or explains a family of modal facts about which states are geo-
metrically possible, where geometric possibility does not reduce to physical possibility
(Belot, 2013, 50-51).
• It is a (higher-order) law of nature that the geometric symmetries of the structure are
dynamical symmetries of the theory (Skow, 2006; Janssen, 2009).
• Forces propagate across the spatial distances defined by the metric characterizing the
structure (so that long-range forces like electromagnetism fall off proportionately to
the inverse square of this distance, and so on).
Again, this is not meant to be an exhaustive list. Rather it is meant to illustrate that
a vast number of different criteria could plausibly figure into our ascription of the name
‘spacetime’ to a given theoretical structure, depending on the details of the laws that define
that structure. And indeed, Knox’s own criterion,
• The structure determines the difference between inertial and non-inertial frames of
reference,
belongs high on this list, perhaps even at the top. She has certainly shown that it’s a very
important criterion. My only disagreement is with her claim that it is the sole criterion.
5 Fundamentality and functionalism
I’d now like to advance what I think will be a more controversial criterion that I claim counts
toward our spacetime concept. A structure is more apt to be called ‘spacetime,’ I claim, the
more physically fundamental it is.
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I don’t intend this proposal to stand or fall with any particular account of fundamentality.
As a rough guide, structure A is more fundamental than structure B if A features in the
basic laws of a more fundamental theory. So for example, the metric of general relativity
is more fundamental than the metric of Newtonian gravity theory, and quantum fields are
probably more fundamental than particles. As another rough guide (often related to the
first), A is more fundamental than B if B is composite or emergent and A is not. So quarks
are more fundamental than protons, and energy is more fundamental than temperature.
The arrival on the scene of proposed quantum gravity theories where spacetime emerges
from a more fundamental non-spatiotemporal substrate has sometimes been taken to imply
that there is no connection between fundamentality and our spacetime concept. There had
better not be any such connection, the thought goes, because we exist in spacetime and yet
there’s a good chance that spacetime is emergent in our world.
But on the cluster concept view of spacetime, this inference rests on a confusion. Funda-
mentality can be a criterion for the spacetime concept even if the actual spacetime we live
in fails that criterion. This is especially true given that fundamentality is a graded notion,
and the emergence of spacetime is only proof that it cannot be perfectly fundamental. The
spacetime we live in might still be highly fundamental, so that the fundamentality crite-
rion still provides part of the explanation for why the spacetime we live in falls under our
spacetime concept.
On reflection, there are clear reasons why fundamentality ought to count as a criterion
for our spacetime concept. To begin with, the referents of our words (and so too the exten-
sions of our concepts) are probably determined in part by the fundamentality of objects and
properties in the world. In particular, Lewis (1984) has argued persuasively that, for any
descriptivist theory of meaning for words or thoughts to succeed, it must privilege interpre-
tations of our language and concepts that refer to more fundamental properties over ones
that refer to less fundamental properties.
Second, the notion that fundamentality is a criterion for the spacetime concept fits well
with both substantivalist and relationist conceptions of spacetime. Substantivalists about
general relativity, for example, tend to hold that spacetime is among the most fundamental
structures described by the theory. Indeed, North (forthcoming) has recently argued that
substantivalism should be defined as the claim that spacetime is at least as fundamental as
material objects. (This is my preferred definition of substantivalism, and I will assume it for
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the remainder of this essay.) On the other hand, spacetime is obviously not a fundamental
substance according to relationists.9 But it is typical for relationists to hold that spacetime
is constituted by a system of highly fundamental relational properties. It is hardly common
for relationists to suggest that spatiotemporal relations are reducible to something more
fundamental within the domain of general relativity, for example. So all parties to the
substantivalist/relationist dispute would seem to agree that spacetime is highly fundamental,
if not perfectly fundamental.
Finally, the inclusion of fundamentality as a criterion in our spacetime cluster concept
allows us to explain why we are tempted by what Knox calls the “container metaphor.”
There is obviously something intuitive about this metaphor, which has often been used by
substantivalists to describe and motivate their view. The idea is that spacetime is a sort of
container for matter, with material objects as its contents.
Knox considers an objection to her inertial functionalism arising from this picture: there
is no guarantee that the structure determining inertial trajectories is the same structure in
which matter is “contained,” and so there is no guarantee that inertial functionalism gives
the right answer about what should count as spacetime. Knox responds that this criticism
is akin to (but much less plausible than) qualia-based objections to functionalism about
the mind: “Just as the believer in Zombies, or the proposer of homunculus-head thinks that
states could fill the functional role of mental states, but nonetheless be missing something, the
proponent of the container thinks that spacetime functionalism fails to capture the essential
nature of spacetime.” (Knox, in progress, 16) But as Knox responds, unlike in the case of
conscious experience, we cannot claim to have any direct access to the essential “container”
nature of spacetime. So there is ultimately no rigorous sense to be made of the container
metaphor.
This is a damning objection insofar as the container metaphor is meant to rest on a
brute intuition about spacetime having a container-y nature which is not describable except
via the metaphor. But it is not obvious that the metaphor’s defenders can’t spell out what
they mean in more literal terms. For example, in his discussion of the nature of space in
non-relativistic quantum mechanics, David Albert draws a distinction between “the space
of possible interactive distances” (which I take to be the entity Knox aims to define using
9I take relationism to be the denial of substantivalism–that is, following North, the claim that spacetime
is less fundamental than matter.
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inertial functionalism) and the “stage on which whatever theory we happen to be entertaining
at the moment depicts the world as unfolding.” (Albert, 1996, 282) So far all we’ve been
given is a metaphor, but Albert continues: “a space (that is) in which a specification of the
local conditions at every address at some particular time (but not at any proper subset of
them) amounts to a complete specification of the physical situation of the world, on that
theory, at that time.” (Albert, 1996, 282-283; all italics are of course Albert’s)
This is a literal, not metaphorical, definition of the sense in which Albert thinks of
space(time) as a container. Indeed, it is a functional definition in the same sense as
Knox’s inertial definition of spacetime–it specifies a role in the laws that spacetime (qua
arena/container) must fill. There remains a small puzzle, insofar as theories may admit
more than one geometric description that satisfies Albert’s criteria. But I take Albert’s sug-
gestion to be that the space in which the world “unfolds” is the most fundamental geometric
structure meeting his criteria. Earlier he writes: “the three-dimensional multiple-particle lan-
guage of our everyday lives supervenes on the exact and complete and fundamental language
of the world, which is the language of wave functions (and whatever else) in configuration
space.” (Albert, 1996, 279) A different geometric formalism might provide the same infor-
mation about the physical state, but on Albert’s view, it would do so in less fundamental
terms than the configuration space formalism, and thus it would not represent the space in
which the quantum world unfolds.
Albert concludes that our spatial concept is really two separate concepts–interactive
distance structure and stage on which the world unfolds–and that these two concepts are co-
extensional in classical physics but not (on his view) in quantum physics. There is certainly
something to this claim, and in particular, we can always ask whether a theory posits a fun-
damental background (a fundamental geometric structure meeting Albert’s criteria) which is
distinct from the space(time) of interactive distances, or from Knox’s inertial structure. But
there is also a risk of multiplying concepts indefinitely, if we treat each logically independent
feature we ordinarily take spacetime to have as a separate concept of a sense in which a
structure can be spacetime. To the contrary, it seems to me that we do have an overar-
ching concept of spacetime as the sort of entity that ideally ought to meet many different
criteria–to repeat myself, a cluster concept.
The real lesson of Albert’s work on configuration space is that fundamentality is one
of the criteria for our spacetime concept. In some theories, there may be no fundamental
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background geometry, or there may be a fundamental background which fails too many other
criteria to count as spatiotemporal. But the more fundamental a background geometric
structure is, the more apt it is to satisfying our spacetime concept, other things being equal.
If we accept that fundamentality is one of the criteria for our spacetime concept, further
lessons follow about the interesting and much-discussed case of spacetime in Newtonian
mechanics.
This is a debate that lends itself to a pernicious equivocation if one is not careful. The
central question is usually phrased in roughly this way: What is “the spacetime setting
for Newtonian physics”? (Wallace, forthcoming) The question is ambiguous between two
possible readings:
A Assuming we know the laws of Newtonian mechanics are true, what should we conclude
about the structure of spacetime (on the basis, perhaps, of principles like inference to
the best explanation)?
B What sort of spacetime structure is entailed by the proposition that the laws of Newtonian
mechanics are true?
Clearly an answer to question B will be less modest than an answer to question A. Indeed,
it seems natural to suppose that no particular spacetime structure is entailed by Newton’s
laws of motion, because these laws by themselves are compatible with a variety of different
spacetime theories: the separate space and time that Newton himself posited, neo-Newtonian
spacetime, or the dynamically curved spacetime of Newton-Cartan theory.
But if one assumes inertial functionalism, a definite answer to question B comes easily.
For on inertial functionalism, there is a unique minimal structure necessary to represent the
theory’s inertial structure–or rather its lack thereof, since such theories can make do with a
geometry Saunders (2013) calls Newton-Huygens spacetime, which lacks a global distinction
between inertial and non-inertial trajectories. Subsystems in such a theory will exhibit local
inertial structure, though, leading Wallace (forthcoming) to suggest (following the argument
of Knox (2014)) that Newton-Cartan theory is the effective spacetime structure at the level
of such subsystems (again, assuming inertial functionalism).10
10For further complications of this debate, see Weatherall (forthcoming, 2016), Dewar (forthcoming) and
Teh (forthcoming).
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The details of this debate about inertial structure are quite beyond the scope of this
essay, but I have a single comment to add. Suppose one accepts the arguments of this paper,
and in particular the arguments of this section. Then determining the inertial structure of
Newtonian mechanics, as previous parties to the debate have sought to do, will not auto-
matically answer the question of what should count as the spacetime structure of the theory.
For example, it may turn out that Newton-Huygens structure is sufficient to describe motion
in Newtonian mechanics, but that the fundamental geometric structure of the theory should
be understood to be the dynamically curved geometry of Newton-Cartan theory. (Follow-
ing North, I take this possibility to be equivalent to substantivalism about the spacetime
of Newton-Cartan theory.) It is especially easy to imagine fundamentality breaking the tie
between these two candidate geometries because they are so similar; as shown by Wallace,
they share the same structure at the level of isolated subsystems.
Suppose we accept that fundamentality might be sufficient to break the tie between
different candidate spacetime geometries which disagree about inertial structure. Then the
question of what counts as spacetime cannot be answered without doing some metaphysics–
we need to determine which geometric structures are fundamental in order to answer it. If
fundamentality is epistemically accessible to us (perhaps because more explanatory, simpler
or more parsimonious structures should be assumed to be fundamental) then the question
about spacetime structure may be answered, though perhaps not with great confidence. If
we have no way to determine which structures in a given theory should be assumed to be
fundamental, on the other hand, the question of what is the right spacetime structure for
Newtonian mechanics is likewise unanswerable.
6 Conclusions
I am a spacetime functionalist, and if I’d grasped what it meant to be a spacetime functional-
ist prior to encountering Knox’s work, I would always have identified as one. So I’m thankful
to Knox for presenting an illuminating framework which I take to be the only reasonable
framework for analyzing our spacetime concept. But I don’t believe the correct analysis of
that concept will take a simple, easily-stated form. We use the word ‘spacetime,’ fruitfully
and aptly, to describe a wide variety of different theoretical structures defined within very
different theories. Some of these structures have nothing to do with inertia.
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It seems to me that only the cluster concept view is flexible enough to hold any promise
as an accurate analysis of our spacetime concept. And even if a different approach ultimately
proves better able to analyze that concept, that approach will not bear much resemblance
to Knox’s inertial functionalism.
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